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BY  BENJAMIN  STOREY

The virtues of liberal education — and why it is worth pursuing.

I

n 1837, Ralph Waldo Emerson delivered a withering
critique of the state of American higher education
to the Phi Beta Kappa Society at Harvard. His speech,
“The American Scholar,” bristled with barbs at the
bearded sages who made up his audience — the Harvard
faculty, which had considered Emerson a mediocrity
when he was their student.
First, he attacked their worship of old books.
“Meek young men,” Emerson said, “grow up in libraries,
believing it their duty to accept the view which Cicero,
which Locke, which Bacon, have given.” When they
accept this authority, he went on, “instantly the book
becomes noxious; the guide is a tyrant,” and the reader
is reduced to a mere “bookworm.”
Second, he chided the members of America’s preeminent learned society for their lack of engagement
in active life: a man who lives a life without action,
he said, “is not yet a man.” Emerson thus argued for
liberation from the tyranny of old books and the
embrace of the active life as a corrective to the vices
of contemplativeness that, in his view, plagued the
scholarly audience before him.

T

imes have changed since 1837. Our scholarly
establishment bears only the vaguest resemblance
to the one Emerson attacked. Yet we, too, have our
characteristic blind spots and weaknesses. What are
they? Are we still the passive bookworms Emerson
described, or do our difficulties lie elsewhere?
The most obvious problem with American higher
education today is its grotesque sticker price. For this,
there is plenty of blame to go around. Administrators
build legacies by creating programs and positions to
address campus concerns, both real and imaginary;
these things cost money. Faculty want raises,
sabbaticals and research support; these things also
cost money. Parents and students want nice gyms
and dining halls and dorm rooms, freshly mown grass,
ubiquitous Wi-Fi, and, above all, that priceless bubble,
reputation. All these things cost money.
But the deeper problem with the contemporary
state of American higher education is not financial
or even institutional, but philosophical. The present
generation of administrators and faculty is not very
good at explaining what a liberal education is, and

why students and parents should pay the exorbitant
price we charge for it.
When asked to explain ourselves, faculty and
administrators face two opposed temptations. One
is to wrap ourselves in the mantle of faculty selfgovernance, haughtily asserting that we do not need
to justify our activity to students or their parents, but
only to each other, as we bearers of Ph.D.s are the only
competent judges of what constitutes a liberal education. Behind closed doors, we go along to get along,
indulging our colleagues’ research interests, their
political hobby-horses, and even their actual hobbies,
resulting in incoherent curricula cobbled together out
of courses such as “Surfing and American Culture” and
“The Horror Film in Context” (real courses, presently
taught at prestigious American universities). In the face
of this distinctly academic combination of arrogance
and fecklessness, increasing public demands for
greater accountability are understandable.
This leads to the alternative temptation, perhaps
even more dangerous: justifying what we do in terms
of the commercial marketplace.
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The liberal arts can be understood as nothing less than the arts
that teach us how to avoid taking our existence for granted.
Since we’re asking for a $200,000
investment, we justify its worth in
terms of its effect on one’s standard
of living. There is some truth to
this; college graduates earn about
$1 million more over a lifetime than
high school graduates, according to
the census bureau. But the use of
this kind of cost-benefit analysis to
justify liberal education is a dangerous game. The economic benefits
of vocational courses in nursing
or information technology, for
example, are far more apparent than
those of courses in Shakespeare,
theoretical physics, or my own
discipline, political philosophy —
areas traditionally understood to be
at the heart of liberal education.
To be clear, I have no intention
of disparaging nursing or information technology. Nurses and computer technicians do real and palpable good in the world, more so than
many college professors. But vocational education and liberal education
are not the same thing.
What, then, is a liberal education, and why is one worth pursuing?
What can liberal arts colleges such as Furman say to justify their pricey
existence when Americans have begun to question the costs of higher
education with growing and justified intensity?
A powerful argument in defense of liberal education was once
offered by one of modern society’s most acute observers, Alexis de
Tocqueville. At the very same moment when Emerson was arguing
that American higher education was excessively bookish and too far
removed from practical life, Tocqueville argued for the opposite view.
For Tocqueville, one of the defining characteristics of a commercial
democracy like ours is its restless mobility, its busyness. Tocqueville
knew that the restless activity of American society is part-and-parcel
of its distinctive excellences: its extraordinary freedom and widespread
prosperity, which he celebrated. However, no society enjoys all good
things, and Tocqueville pointed out that an excessive and narrow
attachment to activity, business, practicality and change is our
characteristic vice. We Americans tend to become not bookworms,
but busybodies.
Universities, in Tocqueville’s view, can be seen as points of resistance
to this American tendency, islands of patience in a culture of haste.
In this, he alerts us to one of the many meanings of the word “liberal”
in liberal education: liberal in the sense of free from the day-to-day
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pressures of productive life. Of what
use is liberal education — understood, in this Tocquevillean way,
as a little taste of a contemplative
leisure more at home in aristocratic
societies — to people who are
not aristocrats and have no
intention of spending their lives
locked in libraries?
A liberal arts education can
serve as an introduction to a
variety of activities that constitute
the leisurely, contemplative way
of life celebrated by the Western
philosophic tradition. Foremost
among these activities are the
intensive study of old books,
friendship centered on conversation, and the cultivation of the
capacity and taste for solitary
reflection. A liberal arts education
can nurture all of these activities,
begetting a lifelong disposition to engage in them.
For now, I want to argue for the importance of the first activity
I mentioned — studying old books with precisely the kind of devotion
Emerson attacked in “The American Scholar.” What good does this
activity do for students, particularly those who do not plan to be
scholars? What does it offer them in terms of the roles they can
expect to play in life when they leave college — as someone’s future
husband or wife, as someone else’s future mother or father, and as
a human being who longs for happiness and desires to understand
his or her place in the world?

A

comment from the philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau provides
a useful starting point for considering this question. According
to Rousseau, philosophy is something “man needs in order to be able
to observe once what he has seen every day.” Rousseau was famous for
his paradoxes, and this statement is surely one of them. After all, what
can it mean to say that we need something as abstruse as philosophy
to observe what we see every day — the things most familiar to us?
Another philosopher, Josef Pieper, helps us understand what
Rousseau is driving at. Pieper offers a telling critique of the limits
of the mind of the bourgeois, the productive citizen of a commercial
democracy (that is, of all of us, insofar as we are all citizens of such
a regime and must work for a living). The bourgeois, for Pieper, “accepts
his environment defined as it is by the immediate needs of life.” When
we look at the world, we tend to see everything in terms of its utility

or practical significance. We see that money, for example, is an
eminently useful thing, and rarely interrogate its meaning further.
We see that food is useful for eating, and rarely wonder what it means
to be a being that eats.
This ready-made utilitarian perspective on the world is indispensible
to all of us insofar as we are practical beings. We do not ordinarily ask
what stop lights mean; we stop, as we should. However, to see something
in practical and utilitarian terms is to take its meaning for granted, and
this way of looking at the world tends to become all-pervasive. Bit by
bit, Pieper cautions, we slip into taking “everything for granted,” which
leads him to wonder, “Are we to take our very existence for granted?”
Surely there are some things — love, family, nature, God, our own souls
— we do not wish to take for granted. After all, to see one’s spouse or
one’s children in utilitarian terms is not to see them at all.
To see the people around us and the natural whole we inhabit
on their own terms, to wonder at them and encounter them in their
full mysteriousness, requires that we struggle against the grain of the
practical and utilitarian perspective that is necessarily dominant in our
lives as working Americans. Here, the liberal arts can help. Indeed, the
liberal arts can be understood as nothing less than the arts that teach
us how to avoid taking our existence for granted.

I

f the point of liberal education is to help us see things with fresh eyes,
and thereby really see them, what can it mean to say that intensive,
even reverent, study of old books is at the heart of such an education?
How can the encounter with the old help us to see things anew?
As an example of how an old book can teach us really to see things,
as if for the first time, consider what one might learn about love from
Plato’s Symposium. Popular culture is endlessly productive of songs and
films and YouTube clips that offer to teach us love’s meaning, some of
which have interesting and true things to say. But their range is limited,
for they are the products of a relatively narrow and familiar slice of
history and usually offer slight variations on themes we’ve heard before,
rather than shocking us into seeing a phenomenon such as love in all
of its real and invigorating strangeness.
The myth told by Aristophanes in Plato’s Symposium is a perfect
window into that strangeness. According to Aristophanes, each of us
once had four legs, four arms, two faces, and two sets of genitals. We ran
by tumbling in a circle, “were awesome in strength and robustness,” had
“great and proud thoughts,” and therefore launched an assault on the
gods. The gods defeated us, and punished and hobbled us by cutting us
in half, an operation that left us longing for our primordial wholeness.
Aristophanes calls that longing eros, “the bringer together of [our]
ancient nature,” “the desire and pursuit of the whole,” the search for
that missing half of ourselves that alone could make us feel complete
again. Aristophanes thus explains why human love longs not merely
for sex, but for embracing one another and holding each other tight —

as if trying to form a physical whole out of two irremediably separate
bodies — for his myth describes those embraces as our response to our
experience of ourselves as painfully, almost unnaturally, incomplete.
A few pages later, Plato has Socrates recount the lessons in love
taught him by a mysterious wise-woman named Diotima. According
to Diotima, “eros is the whole desire of good things and being happy.”
It is the ubiquitous longing felt by every human soul for the allcomprehensive flourishing which alone, for the ancients, merited the
name happiness. Diotima explicitly contrasts her view to Aristophanes’
claim that love is a longing for physical wholeness, “for human beings
are willing to have their own feet and hands cut off if their opinion
is that [they] are no good.”
Plato thus gives us two accounts of love, both profoundly evocative,
but plainly in conflict with each other — which is precisely his intention. For the conflicts between these two accounts of love force us to
wonder whether love is, most fundamentally, the desire for happiness
or the desire for wholeness. To ask that question is to ask the Socratic
questions that unify Plato’s dialogue: What unites the many phenomena
that we refer to as love? What is love, in and of itself? What does this
longing, so potent in all of us, long for?
Plato’s dialogue does not tell us what the answer is but leads us,
instead, to interrogate our own experience. He thereby turns our
experience into a question for us, which is in some ways to show
us that experience for the first time. For it is when we experience
a phenomenon such as love as mysterious, as inexplicable in terms
of the clichés we have all learned to parrot about it, that we really
see it with our own eyes — really experience it. Strangely enough,
this self-aware, experientially lively ignorance has to be learned.
This is precisely what the liberal arts have to teach.
One could give countless further examples of phenomena old
books can teach us really to see for the first time. Concerning children,
John Locke quotes a marvelous aphorism from an ancient author:
“the greatest reverence is owed to children.” We tend, rightly, to revere
the old; Locke here suggests that we also revere the new. For our
example, as Locke points out, always leaves its mark on these mysterious
little bundles of possibility, who will, eventually, replace us. On Locke’s
account, being in the presence of one’s children, exacting observers
that they are, is not a little like being in church.
When it comes to our happiness, Aristotle can help us see it anew
when he argues that happiness is a life dedicated to “the activity of
the soul in accordance with virtue.” Raised as we are amid swarms
of hedonistic images that might lead us to believe that happiness
consists of a limitless pig-out enjoyed before a never-ending Super
Bowl, Aristotle’s argument reminds us that we feel ourselves most
alive, and experience our being most fully and joyously, not when we
belly up to the trough but when we put our beings to work, exercising
our highest faculties not for the sake of profit but because such activity
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is intrinsically delightful. Given this understanding, the seminar room, the surgeon’s
theatre, the basketball court and the soup
kitchen are all more likely places to look for
happiness than the bar or the beach.
Finally, on the question of the character
of the world in which we find ourselves, the
book of Genesis can help us see that world
anew by raising what is perhaps the most
basic questions there are: Why does the
whole, the universe, exist at all? Why do we
experience it as beautiful, and as ordered in
a way our minds can, at least partially, understand? Giving full and final answers to such
questions is, of course, probably beyond the
capacity of the human mind. Nonetheless, by raising those questions, Genesis can allow us to see the world not as a mere collection
of natural resources to be exploited for our practical benefit but as
an astonishing marvel at whose source we can only wonder.

B

y opening our eyes to the strangeness of our life and its many
gifts, old books can thus help us to experience love, family, happiness, and the question of the whole on their own terms. One does
not necessarily need to go to college to experience this revelation,
but it helps.
The books I’ve drawn on are from distant times and places.
They contain strange images, demanding arguments, and paradoxical propositions that are most difficult to understand, particularly
on a first reading. To pierce them requires a level of attention almost
impossible to give them when immersed in the responsibilities
of post-collegiate life, when work and children typically demand
the best of one’s time and energy. Leisure, guidance from properly
trained teachers, and the company of fellow inquirers who share
the openness characteristic of the young can be enormously useful
in the study of such difficult yet rewarding texts. The university is
uniquely suited to provide a home for this impractical yet demanding
activity in a relentlessly practical world.
It is a remarkable testament to the unique genius of our country
that, in spite of its utilitarian and commercial nature, it has seen fit
to make this kind of education, truly liberal education, the passkey
to its most respected professions and a widely available, if expensive, good. It has perhaps done so because, from our Puritan origins,

This essay emerged from the inaugural Francis W. Bonner American Scholar
Lecture, delivered by Benjamin Storey on August 31, 2011. The lecture series
was established by Furman’s Phi Beta Kappa Society (Gamma of South
Carolina) to recognize the spirit and tradition of Ralph Waldo Emerson’s
Phi Beta Kappa lecture on August 31, 1837.
The series highlights the ideals of Phi Beta Kappa, the nation’s oldest
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Americans, who care so much about the
goods of the body, are nonetheless keenly
aware that we also have souls, and that
souls need their own kind of food.
As Peter Lawler of Berry College, who
spoke at Furman in 2010 as part of the
Tocqueville Program Lecture Series, has
pointed out, the Puritans believed that
“nobody was above work, and nobody
was below leisurely contemplation about
our true destiny.” In this sense, while
liberal education may seem impractical
when considered from the vantage point
of the commercial marketplace, it looks
distinctly more practical if we ask what is
practical for beings who are more than just bodies, and are possessed
of more than just bodily needs.
Perhaps Emerson was right to warn the Harvard faculty about
the tyranny of old books and the vices of idleness in 1837. Over the
long term, however, it seems to me that Tocqueville more deeply
understood the relationship between liberty and liberal education
in democratic times. For Tocqueville understood that hyperactivity,
not idleness, is the characteristic vice of democratic peoples, and
that the present, not the past, is most prone to tyrannize over the
democratic mind. If liberal education can liberate the mind from
that tyranny, one could seriously defend it as priceless.
“Priceless,” however, is a vague term, and a liberal education
in our time costs an enormous amount of very real money. Can
universities justify charging, can families justify paying, all those
hard-earned dollars for what liberal education has to offer? That
is for administrations, faculties, students and parents to decide.
But perhaps we can think more clearly about the proper price of
a liberal education if we see it for what it truly is. Liberal education,
rightly understood, is the most useful tool available to us in what
George Orwell called the “constant struggle” necessary “to see what
is right in front of one’s face.” Liberal education, rightly understood,
is the education that liberates the human person from the very real
and costly temptation to take one’s whole existence for granted. |F|
The author, an associate professor of political science, joined the Furman
faculty in 2005.

academic honor society, and the centrality of liberal learning in the American
experience, and is designed to give students a better sense of how their degrees
fit into a broader world of ideas at the commencement of a new academic
year. It is named in honor and memory of Francis Bonner, longtime university
provost and academic dean, who championed the establishment of a Phi Beta
Kappa chapter at Furman.

Alexis de Tocqueville by Theodore Chassereau

February 22, 2012

“Do American
Colleges Today Serve
Any Public Function?”
John Agresto
Former president, St. John’s College

March 14, 2012

“Science and
Liberal Education”
Harvey C. Mansfield
William R. Kenan, Jr.,
Professor of Government
Harvard University

April 17, 2012

“Liberal Education
and Political Liberalism”
Anthony Kronman
Sterling Professor of Law
Yale University
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URMAN’S TOCQUEVILLE PROGRAM LECTURE
Series brings prominent scholars and public intellectuals
to campus to engage the moral questions at the heart
of political life.
The program takes its name from Alexis de Tocqueville,
perhaps the greatest student of modern democracy, who understood both the difficulty and the necessity of reminding citizens
of a decent and prosperous regime about questions of truth,
nobility and eternity. These questions are not always comfortable
to discuss and are never easily resolved. However, as Tocqueville
understood, they cannot be ignored by those who seek to live
lives of freedom and dignity.
This spring, the Tocqueville Program (schedule left) is focusing on the theme of “Liberal Education and Liberal Democracy.”
From the beginning of the American Republic, the best statesmen
and thinkers have seen an essential connection between liberal
democracy and liberal education. According to Thomas Jefferson,
the extensive educational plan he proposed for his native Virginia
was a necessary means for “rendering the people the safe, as they
are the ultimate, guardians of their own liberty.”
The rigorous education in politics and history Jefferson envisioned, however, has little relation to what is taught in American
universities today. In spite of a price tag that strains the limits
of middle-class credulity, universities and colleges often offer
curricula with little apparent coherence and seem increasingly
incapable of articulating the high and noble purpose of liberal
education in a democratic society. Thus the effort to answer the
question, “What is liberal education?”
Contact benjamin.storey@furman.edu to learn more about the
Tocqueville Program.
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